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The paper differs from more common literature regarding trust in political and democratic institutions in post-communist countries. Rather, it explores trust in religious institutions-an often neglected area, and frequently the second most trusted type of institution in the post-communist region after the army. In addition, the paper tests a cultural theory of interpersonal trust and evaluates recent reformulated secularization theories related to trust in institutions.
Does a high level of religiosity within a society imply that that the society also has high trust in religious institutions? This analysis will show that Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia exhibit low levels of religiosity as measured by attendance, prayer and fasting, similar to many countries in Western Europe. However, all three countries have high levels of trust in religious institutions although they experienced peculiar forms of assertive statesponsored modernization and secularization during the Soviet Union.
This peculiarity may be one of the reasons why Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia present an unusual puzzle for two different forms of secularization theory.
ii These are all countries that would be considered secular under earlier versions of secularization theory that focused on declining religious practices. However, these countries would be considered nonsecular with respect to the more recent adaptations of secularization theory that concentrate on declining religious authority (sometimes measured by trust in religious institutions).
The fact that trust in religious institutions is not a function of religiosity as measured by religious practice in the South Caucasus also indicates that we need to better understand the explanatory value of the term religiosity. This study uses two different measures of this multidimensional concept. First, religious practice is defined by attendance at religious services, prayer and fasting. Second, we consider the subjective importance of religion in daily life.
Similarly, the European Values Survey (EVS) characterizes religiosity in two dimensions: intrinsic and external religiosity.
iii External religiosity refers to an individual's adherence to a particular religious denomination or religious beliefs and practices. This includes attendance at religious services and participation in religious rituals. Intrinsic religiosity refers to self-identified religiosity such as a belief in God, regular prayer, the subjective importance of God and whether or not religion is considered to provide comfort and strength. This paper; however, will classify prayer as religious practice and include it as a form of external religiosity because it is a form of outward behavior such as attendance at religious services and participation in religious rituals.
The aim of this paper is threefold. First, it is one of few analyses to test theories of institutional trust specifically in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. While the military is often the most trusted institution in many post-communist countries, no work has been done on the oft-most second trusted institution in this region-religious institutions. Second, the article utilizes a different view of religiosity that takes into account the "privatization of religion." Therefore, it seeks to shift the focus of much of the literature on politics and religion from religiosity as defined by religious practice to a more nuanced understanding of religiosity.
Third, this paper will argue that secularization theory has inadequately operationalized religiosity as practice and as declining religious authority.
The first section discusses literature related to religiosity and secularization. The second examines trust and religiosity in the South Caucasus. The third section provides theoretical perspectives relevant to trust in religious institutions as well as the operationalization of included variables and their associated hypotheses. The fourth segment explains the methodology of the DI survey and includes an analysis and discussion of the findings.
Religiosity and Secularization
Since the 1960s, the religious landscape of many countries has undergone a variety of changes. Western Europe experienced declining levels of church attendance and religious affiliation. The first wave of autochthonous leaders of many post-colonial states was composed of self-proclaimed secularists. These developments, among others, seemed to provide support for secularization theorists such as Dobbelaere (1985) and Wilson (1982) , who, despite their different interpretations of secularization theory, argued that the process of secularization was indeed taking place and that religious practices, beliefs and institutions were losing their social significance.
Nevertheless, global developments that demonstrated the durability of religion as a social force overshadowed these ostensible successes of secularization theory. These include, among other events, the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the rise of the religious right in the United States particularly since the mid-1980s, the increasing political prominence of the Hindutva movement in India, and the religiously-infused political violence of the early Twenty-first Century.
Moreover, the nature of religiosity itself appears to have changed in many societies over time. Much of Europe has transformed toward more individualized religious beliefs with a concomitant decline of religious practice and attendance. Increasing numbers of people who 'believe without belonging' or claim membership in a religious faith without practicing any of its rituals evinces this shift towards "privatized religion". iv For example, the level of "privatized religion" (e.g., the subjective importance of religion and denominational membership) is quite high in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia although levels of attendance, prayer and fasting in these countries are similar to those found in many Western European states. v This shift in the nature of religiosity demonstrates that religion and its influence would not disappear, but rather transform. These changes motivated many secularization theorists to modify the concentration of their theories from a decline in religious attendance, practices and beliefs (Bruce 1995; Greeley 1989 ) to a decline in religious authority (Chaves 1989; Dobbelaere 1989). vi Moreover, this shift has enabled some of these theorists to account for societies in which religious practice and adherence have not dwindled, yet religious authority has (e.g., the United States). Chaves (1994) is one of the main proponents of the notion that secularization is better understood as diminishing religious authority, rather than declining religion (i.e. practice).
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In his view, trust is a measure of legitimacy in religious authority and there are three key ways in which secularization affects religious authority. First, societal institutions become disjoint from religious institutions. Second, the structure and nature of religious institutions approaches that of secular institutions. Third, religious practices and beliefs decline. Hoffmann (1998) remarks that this reformulation of secularization theory helps to reshape the traditional monolithic view of secularization and allows for a more complex interpretation in which secularization can occur in many different ways. Similar to Chaves, Wilson (1985) argues that secularization is a process in which religion has "lost its presidency over other institutions ". viii Thus, this reformulation of secularization theory helps to account for societies with high levels of religiosity including prayer and attendance, but low levels of religious authority.
This brand of secularization theory; however, does not account for the existence of societies with low religious practice and high legitimacy in religious authority as measured by trust. In the traditional view, the three main populations of the South Caucasus could possibly be considered secular due to similar rates of religious practice as in Western Europe.
However, the burden of proof would be placed on the level of legitimacy of religious authorities in the more recent versions of secularization theory described here. A high level of trust in religious institutions would not indicate secularization.
In order to explore the determinants of trust in religious institutions in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, we must understand that religiosity is both a multidimensional and complex concept such that religious practice does not necessarily translate into trust in religious institutions. Figure 1 shows a typology of religiosity in selected countries as measured by attendance at religious services once a week or more and trust in religious institutions.
The high religiosity-high trust category shows a few countries in which the percentages of both church attendance at least once a week and trust in religious institutions are both high (i.e. over 50% of the population). The high religiosity-low trust group presents select countries with a high percentage of church attendance at least once a week, but a significantly lower percentage of trust in religious institutions. The low religiosity-low trust set of countries are those in which a small percentage of the population attends religious services at least once a week and a small percentage trusts in religious institutions. Finally, the low religiosity-high trust category displays some countries in which a small percentage of the population attends religious services at least once a week or more, yet a large percentage has trust in religious institutions. This sinuous relationship between religiosity and trust in religious institutions indicates that we need to better understand why the latter is important and what this means for the legitimacy and authority of those bodies.
Religiosity and Trust in Institutions in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia
This paper is particularly interested in countries where trust in religious institutions is much higher than trust in any political or democratic institution. Trust is important for many types of institutions to function and consistent levels of low trust in political and democratic institutions can easily challenge regime legitimacy (Miller and Listhaug 1999 The frequency of fasting is similarly low, while rates of prayer once a week or more are somewhat higher. In contrast, most respondents in all three countries claimed that religion was 'more' or 'very' important in their daily lives (47.3% in Armenia, 51.7% in Azerbaijan and 72.1% in Georgia). It seems that while religiosity as measured by religious practice is low throughout the region, the subjective importance of religion is quite high. This incongruity between religious practice and the subjective importance of religion suggests that the former is not strongly correlated with trust in religious institutions. Therefore, different aspects of religiosity are important to examine and understand.
To more easily compare rates of religious practice with trust in religious institutions in the region, a religiosity index was created using an average of individual scores for attendance, fasting and prayer.
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The index captures the participatory aspect of religiosity.
The original seven-point scale used to measure attendance and prayer was collapsed into a five-point scale to make these two variables amenable to indexing with fasting which was coded on a 5-point scale. The religiosity index ranges from lowest average participation at 1 to highest average participation at 5.
xxi Table 2 shows percentages of high, medium and low religious participation compared to percentages of distrust, neutrality and trust in religious institutions in the three countries.
What is striking is that while the results show low levels of religiosity in all three countries, over half of the groups also trust their religious institutions in each country. For example, Source: DI 2007. The 5-point religiosity index was collapsed to a 3-point scale. 'Very religious' (5) and 'somewhat religious' (4) was assigned 3 for high religiosity. 'Neutral' became 2 indicating medium religiosity. 'Less religious' (2) and 'not religious at all' (1) were assigned 1 for 'low religiosity'. Trust in religious institutions is originally measured in the DI using a 5-point scale where '1' means 'fully distrust,' and '5' means 'fully trust'. The original 5-point scale has been collapsed to 3 categories in a similar manner as the religiosity index to provide a more straightforward illustration of trust, neutrality and distrust. This result is consistent with findings from the South Caucasus. Table 3 Analysis of the data is needed to evaluate the determinants of trust in religious institutions in these countries.
Theories, Variables and Hypotheses xxxiii
The dependent variable is trust in religious institutions. The DI 2007 measures trust in the religious institutions that the respondent specifically belongs to with the following question: "I will read out a list of social institutions. Please, assess your trust toward them [e.g., the religious institution that you belong to] on a 5-point scale, where '1' means "fully distrust," and '5' means "fully trust."" xxxiv Mishler and Rose (2001) identify two key theoretical perspectives to explain differing levels of trust in institutions. The performance-based theory maintains that trust in institutions is determined by how well individuals think institutions perform. For political institutions specifically, individual-level trust in institutions will be higher the better individuals think institutions perform economically and politically.
The culture-based theory supposes that higher levels of interpersonal trust translate into higher levels of trust in other spheres (e.g., institutions). Mishler and Rose (2001) find support for the notion that trust in people is an indicator of trust in institutions using data from the New Democracies Barometer for ten post-communist countries. xxxv Similarly, several other scholars (Lane 1969; Almond and Verba 1963; Inglehart 1997; Putnam 1992 Putnam , 2000 have used cultural explanations to argue that individuals who trust each other more tend to have more trust in institutions. "People have different opinions whether others are trying to take advantage of them or whether they try to be fair. Using this scale, please tell me which of the opinions expressed here do you agree with, and to what extent?" The scale provided ranges from 1 to 10 where 1 denotes "people would try to take advantage of me" and 10 denotes "most people would try to be fair".
Hypothesis 1: The more an individual trusts other people, the more he/she will trust religious institutions.
In addition to interpersonal trust, trust in state institutions may have an important relationship with trust in religious institutions. Similar to Chaves and Wilson, Sommerville (1998) argues that secularization assumes a loss of religious authority since it must share (or yield) authority with secular entities. That is, less trust in religious institutions implies less legitimacy in religious authority and thus higher trust in secular (e.g., state) institutions. Similar to religious denomination, age, sex, location, education, monthly household expenditure, and perceived economic rung have also been included. While there is no common understanding of the impact of age and education on trust in institutions, these two variables have been associated with trust in institutions in many different contexts (Cole 1973; Norris 1999; Mishler and Rose 2001) . Age is measured in years and age squared has been entered into the model in order to induce linearity.
Usually older individuals are expected to be more religious and have higher trust in religious institutions than younger individuals. However, in the post-communist context older individuals may have less trust in religious institutions if they were socialized in the Soviet Union and experienced the varying Soviet policies towards religion over time. Norris and Inglehart (2004) argue that if the policies of Soviet atheism were effective, then religiosity should be higher in younger generations that grew up after the collapse of the Soviet Union and in older generations that grew up in pre-Communist societies. Thus, middle-aged individuals would exhibit the lowest levels of religiosity. However, Need and Evans' (2001) comparison of age groups in ten post-communist countries finds that younger people displayed lower levels of religiosity (i.e. attendance) due to more urbanization and higher levels of education.
Hypothesis 8: Older individuals will have more trust in religious institutions than younger individuals.
Education is measured using a 1 to 9 scale that captures increasing levels of education from 'no primary education' to a 'post-graduate degree'. This variable is treated as a continuous variable in the model since it has many levels and is measured on an increasing scale.
Hypothesis 9: More educated individuals will have less trust in religious institutions than less educated individuals.
Sex is included as a dummy variable with male coded 1 and female coded 0. Location is also included as a series of dummy variables with residence in the capital or urban area, each coded 1 and 0 for otherwise. xxxix Here rural residence is the baseline category. Monthly household expenditure has been included as a proxy for income since respondents often give more accurate responses regarding household expenditure than personal income. Monthly household expenditure was measured using the relevant national currency. xl I converted these currencies to dollars using the average exchange rate for 2007 in order to compare across countries. Finally, to measure subjective economic status (i.e. perceived economic rung), the DI asked respondents to rank their perceived economic position relative to the rest of their society on a 1 to 10 scale where 1 denoted "lowest rung" and 10 denoted "highest rung". This is also treated as a continuous variable.
Hypothesis 10: Women will have more trust in religious institutions than men. Hypothesis 11: Individuals who reside in the capital or urban locations will have less trust in religious institutions than those living in rural areas. Hypothesis 12: Individuals with higher household expenditures will have less trust in religious institutions. Hypothesis 13: Individuals who rank themselves high on the perceived economic rung will have less trust in religious institutions. Religiosity Indicator
In addition to theories of trust and socioeconomic determinants, both mmodernization and older secularization theories have maintained that the significance of religion would fade due to changes brought about by education, literacy, urbanization and economic growth. xli This paper questions the notion that traditional measures of religiosity (e.g., attendance, fasting or prayer) are sufficient for measuring the impact of religiosity on political and social phenomena. Furthermore, it refrains from assuming that low religious practice is proof of secularization and modernization. Therefore, I have included another variable used to exemplify a different dimension of religiosity-the subjective importance of religion.
To capture this the survey asks: "To what extent do your own religious beliefs help you to make decisions in daily life on a 5 point scale where '1' means that your own religious beliefs are not at all an important influence on your decisions in daily life, and '5' means that your own religious beliefs are a very important influence on decisions in your daily life." Whereas, traditional measures of religiosity often pertain to religious participation or a combination of intrinsic and extrinsic factors, the subjective importance of religion presents a way to better examine "privatized religiosity" as an explanatory variable. The number of primary sampling units (PSUs) was defined in proportion to the number of households within each assigned stratum. Based on the sampling frame, the countries were divided into PSUs with an average PSU size of 500 households in Armenia, 400 in Georgia and 500 in Azerbaijan. Fifty households on average were randomly sampled in each PSU for an interview. In Armenia 2,514 HH and 2509 individual interviews were conducted. In Georgia 2,148 HH and 2,146 individual interviews were carried out. Finally, in Azerbaijan 3,392 HH and 3,354 individual interviews were completed. The unit of analysis for this paper is the individual since we are concerned with levels of trust at the individual level. Therefore, only data from the individual interviews has been examined.
Analysis and Discussion
Trust in religious institutions is an ordered categorical variable with a 5-point scale.
However, it is treated as a continuous variable in this analysis and ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is used. The regression uses the following model and the key independent variables are grouped into three categories: socioeconomic control variables, trust variables and a religiosity indicator.
xlv Trust in religious institutions = α+β 1 (sex)+ β 2 (age)+ β 3 (educational level)+ β 4 (urban residence)+ β 5 (capital residence)+ β 6 (Orthodox religion)+ β 7 (Islam)+ β 8 (economic rung)+ β 9 (household expenditure)+ β 10 (interpersonal trust) + β 11 (trust in army)+ β 12 (trust in police)+ β 13 (trust in parliament)+ β 14 (trust in legal)+ β 15 (trust in president)+ β 16 (importance of religion)+ε. 
In contrast to the Orthodox variable, the negative coefficient for Islam indicates that people who identify as Muslim have lower trust in their religious institution than Armenian
Apostolics. This is consistent with the notion that Azerbaijanis are less "involved" with Islam and its associated "institutions" than the other two groups. The sign of the coefficient for household expenditure is in the expected direction. Christianity and that individuals who identify as Orthodox are not obliged to attend religious services. According to this argument, attendance should not be understood as an indicator of religiosity in the same way it is in the West because Orthodox religiosity is centered on selfidentification rather than religious practice. This may help to explain why Georgians claim that religion is important in their daily lives much more than they participate in religious practices.
In addition to possible denominational differences, the presence of a religious figurehead may be another explanation for why the importance of religion is associated with trust in religious institutions. As in Armenia, Georgia has a national and historical church that is closely linked with Georgian national identity. The patriarch of the GOC, Ilya II, is and one of the most trusted and respected leaders in Georgia. In Azerbaijan, capital residence is the only significant socioeconomic control variable.
This relationship between capital residence and trust in religious institutions may be related to demographics as well as the notion that the CMB is perceived to be a Shia-dominated organization. Caucasus. This is most likely due to the fact that in all three countries, religion is an integral part of national identity, history, and cultural heritage as previously mentioned. Even in Azerbaijan, the association with Islam is based more on culture and ethnicity, rather than religion. Likewise, many of these religious institutions are seen as social institutions instead of strictly religious institutions.
The results also indicate that the two different measures of religiosity have different relationships with trust in religious institutions. The subjective importance of religion (i.e.
intrinsic religiosity) is a significant determinant of trust in religious institutions, while religiosity as measured by religious practice (i.e. external religiosity) is not.
lii Moreover, high trust in religious institutions suggests that religious institutions are considered legitimate by society-much more than many state institutions. The fact that "privatized religiosity" h increased in many countries over time helps to discredit previous secularization theories which claimed that religion and its importance would diminish. Furthermore, the existence of high trust in religious institutions casts doubt on later secularization theories that predict a decline of religious authority.
as
Conclusion

This paper has analyzed the determinants of trust in religious institutions in the South
Caucasus. It has moved from a discussion of religiosity based on religious practice to a more nuanced understanding of religiosity that incorporates the impact of "privatized religion."
The analysis has shown that although religious practice as measured by attendance, prayer and fasting are low in all three countries, religious institutions are the second most trusted in Armenia and Georgia after the army, and the third most trusted in Azerbaijan. The results demonstrate that religious practice does not determine trust in religious institutions, but rather how important people consider religion to be in their daily lives is a significant predictor of trust in all three countries. There are also differences between countries. Georgia is the only country in which interpersonal trust is a significant indicator of trust in religious institutions.
Residence in the capital is only significant in Azerbaijan and it provides the strongest impact on trust in religious institutions in this model. Additionally, Armenia is the only country in which both education and age are significant.
This analysis has used OLS regression to test two theories related to factors that constitute trust in religious institutions. First, cultural theories of interpersonal trust prove ambiguous in the region as a whole. Second, the relationship between religiosity and trust in religious institutions challenges reformulated secularization theories that predict a decrease in 
Appendix B
Crosstab of church attendance and trust in religious institutions (Germany) Source: World Values Survey 2005-2008
The German case provides a classic example of a crosstab between church attendance and confidence in religious institutions in countries with low religious practice. The figure shows lower levels of church attendance associated with higher levels of confidence in religious institutions and higher levels of church attendance associated with lower levels of confidence in religious institutions.
Appendix C: Variable Coding
Religious ii This paper will use the singular term "secularization theory" in order to maintain a clear distinction between sub-literatures within the body of secularization theories that focuses on religious practices as opposed to religious authority. However, it is accepted that there are many different types of secularization theory such that this body of literature should be more accurately labeled in the plural.
iii Allport (1950) Martin (1991) and Berger (1997) to change their position on whether or not the process of secularization is taking place. The former became a sceptic, while the latter renounced his endorsement of secularization. vii According to Chaves (1994) , the way the term religion is understood determines the way secularization will be interpreted. For example, Weberians view religion as a body of beliefs and practices concerning salvation. In this regard, secularization refers to a decline in religious beliefs and practices. xxiii Categories 1 (fully distrust) and 2 (somewhat distrust) were collapsed into a first category (distrust). Category 3 remained neutral as a second category. Categories 4 (somewhat trust) and 5 (fully trust) were combined to make a third category (trust). xxiv Appendix B shows a crosstab of religious practice (i.e. attendance) and confidence in religious institutions in Germany which also has low levels of religious practice. The figure shows the usual x-shaped pattern where higher rates of religiosity are associated with higher rates of trust and vice versa. Sapsford and Abbott find that Belarus also has high trust in many state institutions such as the courts, parliament, executive, president and police, relative to other countries in the post-communist region. One possible reason for this could be that Belarus and Azerbaijan, both authoritarian states, have undergone fewer political and economic transformations than their post-communist neighbours and have maintained a certain level of stability. xxx Another interesting result is that trust in the EU is fairly even among the three countries. It is not higher in EU-aspirant Georgia or lower in Azerbaijan which often has low trust in international and western organizations including NATO and the United Nations. xxxi Marc Morjé Howard makes a similar argument when seeking to explain the weakness of civil society in the post-communist region. He maintains that, in addition to other factors, "postcommunist disappointment" resulted in the aftermath of unfulfilled expectations regarding capitalism and democracy immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union. See Marc Morjé Howard, The Weakness of Civil Society in Post-communist Europe (Cambridge University Press, 2002 xxxvi This line of reasoning has been particularly employed in social capital literature to examine trust as an exogenous factor learned through socialization. Additionally, interpersonal trust is considered a feature of civic virtue in which people who possess a higher level of trust are considered to be more politically engaged and have more trust in political institutions.
xxxviii Membership in the Armenian Apostolic Church, Orthodox Church, or Islam was each coded 1 and 'otherwise' was coded 0. Ethnicity has not been included as an independent variable because ethnicity and religion are highly correlated in the Caucasus. Including both religious denomination and ethnicity would have introduced a high level of multicollinearity into the models. In Armenia and Azerbaijan, the government assigns each settlement to a rural (villages) or urban (cities and towns) type. In Georgia, a daba is a third type of settlement that is in neither rural nor urban. xlii The nine units are the capital, urban-North-East, urban-North-West, urban-South-East, urban-South-West, rural-North-East, rural-North-West, rural-South-East and rural-South-West. xliii Fifty households were selected in order better calculate inter and intra-cluster effects regardless of the actual PSU size. The number of PSUs selected in each stratum was proportionate to the total number households in each quadrant. The initial sample size was calculated based on a 95% Confidence Interval, 5% Error Margin and 0.5 population proportion. Individual weights were used in the analysis to make population inferences based on the samples. A database of electricity users provided by the Armenian Electricity Networks Company (AENC) was used to select PSUs in Armenia because census data from the Armenian National Statistical Service (NSS) was unavailable. In Azerbaijan, data from the latest census in1999 was provided by the State Statistical Committee (SSC), and similarly census data from 2002 was used to select PSUs in Georgia. See the DI Methodological Handbook at http://www.crrccenters.org/index.php/en/12/18. xliv Households were randomly selected in all regions from census districts. The respondent for the individual interview was selected among adult HH members using the last birthday method. Therefore, occasionally the HH and individual interviews coincided. xlv I have omitted the religiosity index as a second religiosity indicator to prevent possible endogeneity and reverse causation. Titarenko (2008) found that the level of external religiosity was higher in the Baltic states than in the Slavic states. However, the level of intrinsic religiosity was higher in the Slavic states than in the Baltics. liii Similarly Shlapentokh (2006) notes that Russian's trust in the Orthodox Church is not due to their religious feelings or religiosity. Instead, religious institutions are viewed positively for their role in society. This is also one of the reasons that Russians, similar to Americans, want their leaders to have strong religious beliefs.
